

























Imagining Citizenship in the Levellers and Milton 
Democracy was a mutable concept in the republican writings of the interregnum period. In 
Marchamont Nedham’s hostile characterisation of the type of ‘Democratick, or Popular 
Forme’ which he attributed to the Levellers at the outset of his republican career, democracy 
favoured ‘licentiousnesse’ and the rule of the ‘lowest of the People’, becoming a kind of 
‘Tyranny’; in formal terms it put ‘the whole multitude of the people into the equall exercise 
of the Supreme Authority’.1 But in James Harrington’s Oceana of 1656, ‘democracy’ became 
a term which could describe a highly stratified, mediated, and controlled exercise of ultimate 
popular sovereignty, wildly distant from Nedham’s hackneyed but nightmarish vision of mob 
rule.2 ‘Democracy’ could also be an evanescent word. When the Levellers were promoting 
the rule of an annually-elected unicameral representative, Nedham labelled this ‘democracy’ 
but the Levellers did not. When Nedham himself started to promote the rule of an annually-
elected unicameral representative, he too ceased to call such a system a democracy. When 
Harrington’s avowedly democratic scheme of government became central to the rather 
desperate republican debate of 1659-60, his worried rivals began optimistically to insist that 
some aura of ‘democracy’ might attach to their very different and (to our eyes) even less 
democratic proposals too.3  
This tactical flexibility in the use or non-use of ‘democracy’ for a whole range of non-
monarchical constitutional proposals which invoked the authority of the people is my 
justification – or my excuse – for using this chapter to compare the writings of the Levellers 
and of John Milton, who both steered almost entirely clear of the language of democracy, but 
were enmeshed in these evolving debates about what the power of the people might mean, 
how it could be exercised, and, at some points, what it could be called. The subject of this 
chapter is citizenship – the boundaries of citizenship, the duties and qualities of citizens, and 
the language which the Levellers and Milton used in constituting a body of citizens in their 
writings and in policing the attributes and boundaries of that citizen body. By exploring this 
language, I am intervening in ongoing scholarly debates which have implications for our 
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understanding of early modern talk about democracy. This chapter sheds light on the debated 
relationship between the political thought of the Levellers and that of classical republicans, 
arguing that in spite of profound similarities between the Levellers’ and Milton’s thought, the 
ways in which they developed key elements of their thought ultimately yielded very different 
visions of the citizen body. My argument supports the developing consensus which is 
increasingly breaking down any rigid boundary between ‘liberal’ and ‘republican’ thought in 
the early modern period: both the Levellers and Milton used characteristic elements of both 
traditions, and it was the way in which they fleshed these out, rather than their simple use of 
ideas of rights, consent, freedom as non-domination, or political virtue, which determined the 
ultimate character of their thought. Although my reading tends to reinforce interpretations of 
the Levellers as remarkably radical, and of Milton as more ambivalent about the potential of 
the people for citizenship, it shows that such views could grow from shared intellectual 
foundations.  
 
LEVELLERS AND REPUBLICANS 
The relationship between Leveller thought and republicanism has drawn recurring interest 
from scholars. Samuel Glover, setting up a distinction between popular and elitist 
republicanism, argued that the Leveller movement of the 1640s was more deeply influenced 
by classical republican theory than had been recognised, and that classical texts could be 
plundered for justifications for the political equality of the poor.4  Others have seen this more 
plebeian republicanism apparent in some of the 1650s republican authors and have also 
drawn comparisons with the Levellers.5 In the case of Milton, a tantalising gap in the 
historical record – the lack of an explanation for his failure to fulfil a commission to write 
against the Levellers – has led to speculation about his possible sympathy for aspects of 
Leveller thought. An extensive, though to my mind problematic, case for this sympathy has 
recently been made by David Williams in his book Milton’s Leveller God, but the argument 
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is not new.6 Although this chapter will ultimately argue against an over-assimilation of 
Levellers and republicans, we will see that there are fertile grounds for comparison. 
Many of the structures of thought present in Leveller writing can also be found in 
republican texts. The growth of scholarship which identifies an early modern tradition 
synthesising ‘republican’ with ‘liberal’ elements of thought helps to draw the two closer 
together, highlighting the fact that few republican texts of the period are devoid of ideas of 
rights and consent to government.7 It is rare for either a Leveller or a Miltonic text to pause 
for long enough to set out an elaborated theory of freedom and government, but at the 
moments which come closest, they sound remarkably similar. Milton argued that ‘all men 
naturally were borne free’ and were ‘born to command and not to obey’.8 Leveller authors 
similarly emphasized the original freedom of every man (and, in Lilburne’s case, woman), 
but added an explicit statement of original equality which was not there in that Miltonic 
account. For Lilburne, all humans ‘are, and were [since the Creation of Adam and Eve] by 
nature all equall and alike in power, dignity, authority, and majesty’.9 For Overton, ‘by 
naturall birth, all men are equally and alike borne to like propriety, liberty and freedome’.10 
Tellingly, when Milton did offer an account which emphasised that ‘prime Nature made us 
all equall’ he did not, like Lilburne and Overton, bring this equality into the present by using 
present-tense verbs, but explained that human imperfection – the Fall – had led people 
decisively away from this original state.11 However, the implications of the theory for 
political legitimacy were the same for the Levellers and Milton: those born free could only 
rightly be ruled by their own consent. Such ideas might, in the Leveller as well as the 
republican texts, be combined with more typically ‘classical republican’ elements, including 
an emphasis on the moral qualities and duties of citizenship. Furthermore, the 
characterisation of liberty in terms of freedom from domination, which for Skinner is the key 
                                                          
6 David Williams, Milton’s Leveller God (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2017); 
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to a distinctively early modern republican system of values, also meshed neatly with the 
argument that authority needed consent (this would ensure that authority was non-
dominating). The structural foundations of Leveller and Miltonic political argument were 
thus extremely similar. 
These deep structural similarities between Leveller thought and key points of Milton’s 
republicanism, however, do not mean that Leveller and republican discourses blend 
seamlessly together. The feel of most Leveller writing is very different from Milton’s 
classical republicanism – with some telling exceptions. This difference in feel is partly, and 
revealingly, a matter of written style. The Levellers did not always live up to their self-
presentation as plain speakers who distrusted the tricks of rhetoric, but there is still a world of 
difference between their polemical pamphlets and the grammatical and stylistic elaboration of 
Milton’s English prose.12 Milton regretted exposing the reasoning of his divorce tracts to an 
English-speaking audience rather than couching it in Latin; Leveller authors sought the 
widest possible audience of ‘free-born Englishmen’ for their texts, and sought understanding 
through English, even when reading classical texts. Even though Richard Overton critiqued 
the pedantry and exclusivity of humanist education, it may be no accident that it was this 
Cambridge-educated Leveller leader who often appears most similar to Milton in some of his 
attitudes to citizenship and the people.13 But the differences between the Levellers and 
Milton’s political rhetoric go well beyond issues of style. Even when they were constructing 
arguments based on the same foundations, invoking the same value systems, and using 
overlapping vocabulary, they did so in ways which opened up significant political space 
between them. In this essay I will explore the rhetorical strategies which create or reveal 
these differences.  
 
THE BOUNDARIES OF CITIZENSHIP  
Both the Levellers and Milton rested essential arguments on the authority of ‘the people’, 
but it was never simple to translate this authorising concept into a clearly-defined citizen 
body of those eligible to act for that people electorally and in other civic duties. When the 
Levellers and Milton talked about the qualities their citizens required, who were they even 
including within the bounds of citizenship? The fluctuations and contortions of Milton’s 
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relationship with the English people (‘populus’) which he set out to ‘defend’ in his Latin 
propaganda have been the subject of much scholarship.14 The Levellers’ scattered and 
inconsistent franchise proposals also formed the basis for a long-running debate, recently 
revived by Phil Baker, about how inclusive or exclusive their citizen body was supposed to 
be.15 
Although the scholarship responding to Macpherson redeemed the Levellers from the 
accusation that they would exclude all wage-earners from the franchise, revisionist work still 
foregrounded the exclusions which were contemplated or prescribed by Levellers and army 
radicals, and further fertile work on the Levellers has looked for the roots of their ideas of 
citizenship in the world of London freemen, an exclusive group. Thus Baker points out that 
as late as September 1648 the Levellers were demanding the restoration of the specific 
privilege of the exclusive group of the freemen of London – the ‘comonalty’ of London – to 
elect their Common Councillors – an expansion beyond the current practice, but falling short 
of the harmonised electoral qualifications which applied to both national and local elections 
in the third Agreement of the People in May 1649.16 In that final programmatic statement, the 
Levellers came as close as they ever did to enacting the right of Rainborowe’s ‘poorest hee’ 
to elect, but there were still exclusions on the basis of gender, age, economic dependence, and 
political allegiance: ‘(according to naturall right) all men of the age of one and twenty yeers 
and upwards (not being servants, or receiving alms, or having served in the late King in Arms 
or voluntary Contributions) shall have their voices.’17 This was not the most restrictive of the 
franchise proposals put forward by or in association with the Levellers; it actively removed 
the ‘householder’ requirement of the Officers’ Agreement, retained, as Phil Baker points out, 
even in Lilburne’s dissident version.18 But the Levellers also drew on traditionally exclusive 
entitlements – ‘rights’, ‘liberties’, ‘privileges’ and ‘franchises’ – in ways which did not 
respect their exclusivity. These entitlements, in Lilburne’s powerful rhetoric, became the 
rights of all ‘free-born Englishmen’, a phrase which reverberated through Lilburne’s writing 
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and set up a powerful vision of apparently equal and collective entitlements, even if actual 
proposals were less generous.19 Natural right and English birth together grounded an 
inclusive citizenship, which relatively small numbers forfeited or could not exercise due to 
economic dependence. 
Milton rarely engaged in constitutional prescription, so it is harder to pin down proposals 
which can be compared with his rhetoric. But aspects of his argumentation are very telling. 
Because he was defending the actions of a partisan and purged parliament whose claim to 
speak for the people was transparently contradicted by the public mood, Milton often used 
argumentative sleights of hand to claim for a minority the right to act for the whole people.20 
This recurrent argument may not have been intended to establish the bounds of citizenship 
itself, limiting it to a politically and ethically sound minority, but at least in extremis, Milton 
was willing to contemplate very significant restrictions. In his writings resisting the 
restoration, Milton did propose a constitutional mechanism, a Grand Council, whose 
members would initially be ‘chosen by the people’, but who were ideally to sit for life.21 
Resisting calls for rotation, successive re-elections of the whole body, or the establishment of 
a popular assembly to sit alongside the Grand Council, in the second edition of the Readie 
and Easie Way Milton considered measures which could mitigate the danger of such courses. 
One possibility, if electoral politics was to be given a place, was to ‘wel-qualifie and refine 
elections’, entrusting even the first round of a multi-stage electoral process not to ‘a rude 
multitude’ but ‘only [to] those of them who are rightly qualifi’d’, and committing further 
rounds of winnowing of candidates to ‘others of a better breeding’ to ensure that only the 
worthiest were elected.22 Milton thus envisaged not only a hierarchy between electors, but the 
exclusion of some from electoral citizenship altogether, although he was silent on what would 
qualify some and exclude others. One candidate for that criterion was the intellectual or 
moral capacity of potential citizens. 
 
IMAGINING CITIZENS  
Both the Levellers and Milton drew on powerful descriptive vocabularies and associations 
to paint a picture of the citizen qualities they wished to see, and, in some cases, of the ways in 
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which citizens could fall short of what was desirable. Thus they constructed and policed an 
idealised citizen body.  
Both Milton and the Levellers saw people’s intellectual and moral abilities as key to their 
ability to save or serve the polity. Indeed, the positive vocabulary both used suggested the 
importance of a certain combative and practical kind of virtue, a moral courage which would 
help to defend political liberty. At one level, too, both tended towards generous assumptions 
about the moral potential of the population, assumptions which were perhaps grounded in 
theological beliefs about salvation, but which can be seen to have further ramifications in 
political terms. William Walwyn, in a typically expansive self-depiction, claimed to ‘truly 
and heartily love all mankind, it being the unfeigned desire of my soul, that all men might be 
saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth.’23 Walwyn’s theology of universal grace, but 
not necessarily universal salvation, had much in common with Milton’s belief that all could 
be saved, if they exercised their freedom to accept this grace. Of course, while theology and 
politics were clearly intertwined for Milton and the Levellers, we should not assume a direct 
translation of spiritual equality into political terms. Milton’s republicanism itself was 
grounded in the Aristotelian assessment that the distribution of merit in the population was 
more equal than to justify or tolerate a king: in 1651 he went so far as to say that the 
‘majority’ of men were ‘equal’ ‘in every state’; by 1660, discussing the same Aristotelian 
principle, he had retreated to the assertion that the nation need not ‘fear a scarcitie of able and 
worthie men’ if they were diligently sought out.24 As we have already seen, the Levellers’ 
characterisation of equality was rather more robust, as they asserted it to have been the 
original condition not only of mankind in an ancient state of nature but of everyone at their 
birth; this equality persisted and was fundamental to Leveller thought. In spite of this, 
however, both the Levellers and Milton sometimes castigated people’s moral or intellectual 
failings – in the context of their political failings – in ways which linked them with lowly 
social status. 
For Milton, it was ‘the vulgar folly of men to desert their own reason, and shutting thir 
eyes to think they see best with other mens.’25 The hint of social judgement in ‘vulgar’ 
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(although its main signification here is simply ‘common’) suggests that the active use of 
reason was unlikely to be found at the lowest levels of society, who were – wilfully – in the 
habit of being led. These tropes were common, and the Levellers occasionally resorted to 
them too. Overton reminds us of Milton when he talks of the ‘inconsiderate Multitude, whose 
judgements are guided by custome, more then by reason,’ a thought which Walwyn echoed, 
in spite of his usual generous assertions about the capacity of all for understanding, when he 
argued that ‘most men are transported with flashy fancies, and are unapt to consider things 
judiciously.’26 Even Lilburne, when he thought he might end up on the rough end of the 
crowd rather than having it doing his bidding, was afraid that his enemies might manipulate 
the ‘rude multitude’ into stoning him or tearing him apart.27 In general, however, the 
Levellers avoided the use of the language of status or social description to make pejorative 
points. They resisted the characterisation of their supporters as the lowest of the low, and 
suggested economic solidity, middling social status, and perhaps moral substance too when 
they described them as ‘industrious and laborious’ or ‘nown-substantive’.28 But ultimately 
they argued that ‘the greatest Peers in the Land’ should be no more ‘respected ... then 
somany [sic] old Bellowes-menders, Broom men, Coblers, Tinkers or Chimney-sweepers, 
who are all equally Free borne, with the hudgest men, and loftiest Anachims in the Land.’29 
Milton, although his instincts too were to trust to the middling sort,30 by contrast seasoned his 
works liberally with the vocabulary of social denigration, often using it in contexts which 
implied the intellectual or moral inferiority of the lower ranks of society. He almost 
obsessively differentiated the ‘Worthies’ and ‘men of noblest temper’ (note the approbatory 
use of ‘noble’, another term of social status) from ‘Vulgar and irrational men’ prone to ‘sloth 
or inconstancie’.31 Social status appeared to be strongly correlated with moral qualities. It 
was possible for people to rise above their origins and achieve ‘true nobility’, becoming (in 
Claire Gruzelier’s neat translation) ‘their own ancestors’ through their worth;32 but, as we 
will see, it was also possible for a woman to rise above her gendered status or a man to fall 
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below his, without that affecting Milton’s view of men’s natural superiority: we should not 
assume that these social terms are ‘mere’ metaphors, although even as metaphors they are 
extremely telling.  
But Milton, at some points, had high hopes for his fellow countrymen, who were certainly 
not born to be slaves. It was partly education which would help them to understand, love and 
deserve liberty, and the educative impulse was a constant in Leveller writings too: it was not 
to be taken for granted that people knew their liberties and were impassioned about defending 
them. Both the Levellers and Milton were concerned to ensure that the people were equipped 
to defend their liberties: the Levellers’ writings were relentlessly and self-consciously 
educative in their repetitious exposition of native and natural liberties, while Milton in both 
Of Education and his political works understood education as fitting men for civic life – 
although his was an extensive programme of education which only ‘our noble and our gentle 
youth’ were likely to access.33 But again, divergences did open up between them. The 
Leveller authors tended (although not without exception) to assume that the essentials of 
religious and political life were easily understood, and that the people would be able to grasp 
them as long as they were not prevented from doing so by the oppression and deception (the 
two went together) of abusive elites. For Milton, however, that extensive but exclusive 
education may have been necessary to attain sufficient wisdom at least for any active role in 
politics – without it, people would default to irrationality.  
Ultimately, Milton’s demanding conception of virtue as moral choice, even though it had 
no necessary political or social corollaries, seemed to push towards a moral exclusivity which 
was in danger of taking on a kind of social exclusivity too. Milton often denigrated the 
importance of mere numbers when compared against virtue: it was not the actions of the 
whole nation, or even the whole parliament, which counted, but those of the sanior pars.34 
His lofty conception of individual virtue led him to envisage it, almost by definition, as 
displayed through resistance against the pressures of custom and tides of feeling which 
swayed the multitude. It came to seem almost inevitable that virtue was the property only of a 
few. In his divorce tracts, Milton charitably urged that laws be made which accommodated 
realistically the weakness of the ‘common lump of men’ who were not ‘heroically vertuous’; 
at other times he was less forgiving of that weakness, and exemplars of virtue, particularly in 
politics, were those who stood against the crowd. Judges, magistrates, and commanders’ 
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display of ‘civill prudence’ was assessed by whether they had the ‘magnanimity’ or 
‘fortitude’ to stand by their own ‘judgment’ against the ‘obstinacie of [the] heard’ or ‘the 
rashnes and the clamours of their own Captains and confederates’, holding out against ‘what 
the boisterous Tribunes and Souldiers bawl’d for.’35  
By contrast, the Levellers’ moral condemnations tended to be reserved for the vices of 
exploitative rulers: if the people were in danger of being enslaved to anyone’s lusts, it was 
those of their rulers, not their own. Thus Lilburne warned that the army would be used to 
serve ‘a few mens lusts and lawlesse Pleasures’, and that a small number of men were 
attempting to ‘enslave the Common-wealth, to their owne Pride, Ambition, Lusts, 
Covetousnesse, and Domination if not Dukeship, or Kingship’.36 While Milton emphatically 
agreed that the tyrants and courtiers were as vicious as the broader populace who deferred to 
them, the Levellers had a far more vivid sense of the moral flaws of the rulers – to some 
extent, perhaps, echoing Machiavelli’s sense of the characteristic passions of the dominant 
elite – than of the ruled. That even applies to Overton’s most despairing rhetoric, which has 
something in common with Milton’s tendency to binary moral classification into ‘good men’ 
and ‘bad men’. Thus in 1647, when he was appealing from the fatally corrupted authority of 
parliament to the people at large, Overton anathematised anyone who endangered the human 
rights and freedoms which enable human society as an ‘enemy to mankinde’, and saw ‘this 
our Common-wealth swarming with such Monsters in nature and humanity’.37 This vision 
drew on Cicero’s discussion of tyranny – later used by Milton in his justification for regicide 
– which saw tyrants as ‘fierce and savage monsters in human form’ who ‘should be cut off 
from what may be called the common body of humanity’.38 Overton here applied this to the 
collective tyranny of ‘usurpers and oppressors’ in parliament and their ‘unnatural faction’, 
but he still expressed hope that ‘every rationall honest Common-wealths man’, under the 
leadership of the army in default of a valid parliament, could act together to prevent 
catastrophe. The wicked were to be ‘purged’, but Overton still imagined a strong body of 
citizens with the capacity to do so.39 
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Milton’s emphasis on virtue as resistance against the pressure of the many was so 
consistent that even though the multitude had contributed to the liberation of the country from 
Charles I’s tyranny in the civil war, Milton retrospectively denigrated their actions as the 
result of the desire for ‘noveltie’ which afflicted ‘most men’, only briefly countenancing the 
thought that these men had propounded to themselves just ends, before insisting that their 
‘sloth or inconstancie, and weakness of spirit’, or even their ‘inbred falshood and 
wickedness’ meant that they inevitably failed to sustain the cause.40 As Paul Hammond 
comments, Milton only ‘temporarily recuperates’ the reputation of the ‘people’, ‘multitude’ 
and ‘vulgar’ who constituted the crowd when turning round the royalist narrative in 
Eikonoklastes; ultimately he still condemned their ‘fickleness and instability’.41 This kind of 
language is vanishingly rare in Leveller texts, unsurprisingly given Lilburne’s own 
involvement in the crowd action of the early 1640s42 and the Levellers’ willingness to 
mobilise the crowd in an extra-constitutional way. The Levellers’ references to the multitude, 
or to multitudes of people, were generally emphatic rather than denigratory, in marked 
contrast to Milton’s. 
 
CITIZENSHIP AND SLAVERY 
Citizens, by definition, were not slaves. The powerful language of slavery was woven 
through both the Levellers’ and Milton’s writings, creating a vivid picture of the threats 
hanging over the population. Milton and the Levellers were working from a shared theory of 
(political) slavery as dependence on another’s will, but their divergent uses of the theory 
resulted in different pictures of the citizen body. For the Levellers, largely uncorrupted 
citizens were faced with an external threat of slavery; for Milton, the citizen population itself 
was in danger of becoming servile. 
Both the Levellers and the classical republicans drew on the neo-Roman idea of liberty to 
argue that dependence on the will of another was a total deprivation of freedom, resulting in 
slavery. The Levellers constantly characterised the political oppression and danger which 
they and the nation faced in terms of slavery. As Lilburne’s pamphlet titled Liberty 
Vindicated Against Slavery suggests, in the neo-Roman model, political liberty and slavery 
were binary alternatives. In mid-1649 Lilburne argued that the effect and intention of Pride’s 
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Purge had been ‘by force of arms to ... subject them [the people] to perfect vassalage and 
slavery’; this slavery arose from being subjected to another’s will, rather than able to choose 
their own governors: not even a ‘thousand[th] part’ of the people of England had ‘authorised 
Thomas Pride, with his Regiment of Souldiers, to chuse them a Parliament.’43 This 
conception of political slavery was shared with many of the classical republican authors, and 
Quentin Skinner has used Milton as a key exemplar of this kind of thinking.44 However, 
while the core ‘neo-Roman’ definition of liberty as the absence of enslavement to another’s 
will was shared by Milton and the Levellers, its argumentative implications and the rhetoric 
associated with it could be developed in divergent directions.  
One of the puzzles about the ubiquitous political language of slavery in this period is what 
relation, if any, it bore to the existence of the actual slavery whose horror it drew on 
rhetorically. Mary Nyquist rightly warns that we should not be misled by the ‘obfuscatory 
privileging of figurative slavery’ over actual slavery in Milton’s texts into assuming that he 
condemned the institution outright.45 Steven Jablonski has made a compelling case that 
Milton endorsed the Aristotelian idea of natural slavery in the case of Africans, and found 
slavery to be in accordance with the secondary laws of nature which responded to a fallen 
world. In Jablonski’s reading of Milton, rightful deprivation of political liberty is simply one 
of a hierarchy of states of slavery which were justified by irrationality.46 The Levellers, by 
contrast, did not hint at any legitimate form of slavery. Milton’s reconciliation of slavery with 
original freedom was only possible through an emphasis on the Fall separating us from that 
original freedom – which was not the Levellers’ position. While for Milton government itself 
might be a consequence of the Fall, for the Levellers consenting government was compatible 
with an unfallen state.47 They rejected the possibility of voluntary slavery outright: 
‘according to the Law of God, Nature, and Reason… it is not lawfull for any man to subject 
himself, to be a slave’.48 Milton, of course, was able to use similar arguments when he 
invoked slavery in a political sense: for those who had the capacity and opportunity to be free 
(‘any freeborn man’) it was utterly shameful to submit to slavery, and to reduce oneself to the 
                                                          
43 John Lilburne, The Legall Fundamentall Liberties (1649), title page. 
44 Quentin Skinner, ‘John Milton and the Politics of Slavery’, Prose Studies, 23:1 (2000), pp. 1-22. 
45 Mary Nyquist, ‘Slavery, Resistance, and Nation in Milton and Locke’, in David Loewenstein and Paul 
Stevens (eds), Early Modern Nationalism and Milton’s England (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 
pp. 356-97, p. 357. 
46 Steven Jablonski, ‘Ham’s Vicious Race: Slavery and John Milton’, Studies in English Literature 1500-
1900, 37:1 (1997), pp. 173-90.  
47 Foxley, The Levellers, pp. 24-8; cf. also the discussion of benign collective sovereignty in Regall Tyrannie 
Discovered (London, 1647), p. 11. 





status of those ‘slaves and vassals born’ who had no choice.49 But the flipside of this rhetoric 
was a belief, firstly, that some might not be freeborn and hence might be rightfully enslaved 
(under the secondary laws of nature which also allowed for the creation of government), and, 
secondly, that any who did submit to slavery had, by doing so, displayed a kind of servility 
which deserved such domination. 
If any moral flaw could make a person unsuitable for, or disqualify them from, citizenship, 
it was servility. A slave was the antithesis of a citizen. To depict the people as apt to servility 
was to depict a citizen body which was liable to moral collapse rather then steadfast in the 
defence of liberty and rights. The Levellers apparently agreed with Milton that (in John 
Pym’s words, quoted by Lilburne): ‘A servile condition doth for the most part beget in men a 
slavish temper and disposition.’50 This thought was a powerful source of moral condemnation 
of the people in Milton’s rhetoric, but in spite of reporting the argument, the Levellers rarely 
dwelt on the possibility that the people had succumbed to such servility. Milton, by contrast, 
habitually used the pejorative language of slavery and servility (whether in English or Latin) 
to reflect on people’s moral qualities. In the lofty opening passage of the Tenure of Kings and 
Magistrates, Milton argued that ‘bad men’ were ‘all naturally servile’ and thus prone to 
upholding tyrants.51 In 1660, Milton was still associating vice with servility, and arguing that 
monarchs wanted their subjects to be ‘basest, vitiousest, servilest’ and ultimately 
‘sheepishest’.52 In spite of this strong moral condemnation, Milton did suggest that these 
servile traits were the consequence of slavery. People could be ‘enobl’d’ by liberty, but 
conversely they could ‘degeneratly’ or with a ‘degenerat and fal’n spirit’ fail to recognise or 
embrace liberty; they could suffer ‘debasement of mind’.53 These terms suggest a process of 
debasement or degeneration due to circumstance; indeed in the last case Milton was explicit 
that this debasement was not ‘natural’ for an Englishman.54 The only Leveller writer who 
condemned the vices of servility in a similar way was Richard Overton, who developed at 
length the theme of the morally and intellectually debasing impact of ‘generations of 
usurpers’ since the Norman Conquest. He argued that the people had ‘degenerated from being 
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men’ and become ‘unman’d’, not in a gendered sense, but in the much more profound sense 
that they had become ‘bestiallized in their understandings’ and were ‘as bruits’.55 This 
language then led Overton to the charge that the people had become ‘contented slaves’.56 The 
people were still seen as victims – they were ‘the poore deceived people’ – and Nicholas 
McDowell has read this passage, in the context of Overton’s vitalist belief-system, as an 
expression of Overton’s ‘vision of an egalitarian society where all humans were free to 
become truly human and so more divine.’57 Nonetheless, when Overton described the people 
as ‘stupid, and grosly ignorant’ this began to make them seem complicit in their own 
oppression in a way which was rare in Leveller writing, and certainly resonated with Milton’s 
much more frequent lamentations about the people’s apparent willingness to embrace 
tyranny.58  
Both Milton and Overton linked political servility with degeneration to the level of 
animals – seeing the people as capable of extreme degeneration from the ideals of citizenship. 
Overton thought that slavery had rendered people ‘as bruits’;  Milton too labelled as ‘arrant 
beasts’ those who showed themselves to be ‘by nature slaves’, and extended the animal 
metaphor: they were ‘brutes’ who might be ‘stroked and tamed’ into subservience again.59 
Even here, however, a fascinating space opens up between Milton and Overton which 
suggests that the animal comparison functions rather differently. For McDowell, Overton’s 
language of humanity and brutality was an expression of his materialist, monist, vitalist 
beliefs. Humans had the capacity to degenerate and become bestial, or to move towards the 
divine.60 Milton, at least later in his life, shared these heterodox materialist and vitalist views, 
and Fallon argues that his hierarchy of being was also a distinctively ‘dynamic’ one, where 
‘direction is more important than position.’61 Nonetheless, Milton did not follow Overton’s 
remarkable step of attributing human dominion over animals to human sin and imagining that 
the animals’ innocence would be rewarded in heaven.62 Milton understood ‘dominion’ over 
animals to have existed, even before the Fall, as one of many forms of ‘beneficent 
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hierarchy.’63 For Overton, to compare downtrodden people to animals was not to say that 
they should be subject to the dominion – however benevolent – of their superiors. For Milton, 
that was certainly the implication. 
Servility might be circumstantial, but for Milton, unlike for the Levellers, it might also be 
natural. This raises the possibility that there were men who would always have to be excluded 
from citizenship. Bad men were ‘naturally servile’ and the virtuous were ‘by right’ the 
‘Maisters’ of those bad men who were vicious enough to be tyrants.64 Servility – or at least 
natural servility – justified exactly the kind of political subjection which Milton elsewhere 
described as slavery. A people seeking the return of a king such as Charles I ‘would show 
themselves to be by nature slaves, and arrant beasts; not fit for that liberty, which they cried 
out and bellowed for.’65 Thus the naturally servile could actually deserve enslavement. But 
circumstantial servility, at least when it had been a process of degeneration which lasted 
generations and changed the character of a people or nation, could also, apparently rightly, 
invite servility. The ancient Britons, ‘through long subjection, servile in mind, slothful of 
body’, offered ‘vows of perpetual subjection to Rome’ in return for protection against 
barbarian attacks. The Saxons in turn degenerated, leaving them subject to Danish invasion, 
and prompting Milton to reflect that ‘when God hath decreed servitude on a sinful Nation, 
fitted by thir own vices for no condition but servile, all Estates of Government are alike 
unable to avoid it.’66 By contrast, even when the Levellers considered paradigmatic cases of 
national slavery, they saw that slavery as inflicted ‘(by force of Armes) in the nature of 
Turkish Ianisaries, or the Regiments of the Guards of France’ rather than as deserved by the 
people subjected to it.67  
The authors of the Agreement of the People saw that the nation was in danger of 
‘returning into a slavish condition’, but the Levellers did not conclude that the people were 
slavish.68 They urged the English to ‘speedily look about them, and act vigorously’ to fend 
off this threat, and their more desperate pleas did come close to accusing their countrymen of 
defects in courage: ‘if you sit still and yeeld up your selves, as contented slaves, I cannot see, 
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how you can be excused of madnesse or folly.’69 Lilburne in a rasher moment asserted that 
‘no man can be a Slave but he that is afraid to die’, and felt that the authorities would only 
achieve slavery ‘by crushing in peeces (arbitrarily and tyrannically,) euery cordial hearted 
and Noun-Substantive English man, that dare peepe out in the least to owne his freedomes 
and liberties.’70 In spite of this implied slur on those who survived to be enslaved, the 
Levellers, unlike Milton, described not the people but the people’s oppressors as ‘servile’.71 
The Levellers’ discourse of slavery emphasised the jeopardy the citizen body was in, but 
did not suggest that it was the qualities of the citizens which invited that, although a few 
servile men might choose to aid the oppressors. The Levellers remained able to envisage a 
citizen body largely united in moral courage, although their confidence did occasionally 
falter. In Milton’s vision, by contrast, slavery left a moral taint on the enslaved, and those 
who willingly yielded to slavery almost by definition deserved it – even if that was just, as 
Christopher Hamel argues, because they were willing to connive in enslaving others.72 While 
dangerously servile individuals could undoubtedly endanger the state, Milton also imagined 
the mass of the people becoming servile. This raises again the question of the boundaries of 
his citizen body – whether these might ultimately be based not on the natural free-born status 
on which his grander statements about liberty rested, but on more compromised – or fallen – 
divisions or gradations between the noble and the base, the upstanding and the servile. 
Indeed, slavery or servility was for Milton the most extreme way in which a man might fall 
short of the kind of manhood which enabled him to be both an autonomous household head 
and a citizen. 
 
GENDER AND CITIZENSHIP 
Gender, and in particular the complex expectations of ‘manhood’ which contrasted ‘men’ 
not only with women but with boys and with slaves, was an important element in both 
Leveller and Miltonic constructions of citizenship. While both assumed the exclusion of 
women from formal political citizenship, the ways in which they used gendered language 
helped to build differing images of citizenship.  
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The Levellers and Milton shared a gendered value-system. Neither the Levellers nor 
Milton shook off the gendered norms of early modern politics, although Leveller women’s 
petitions and Milton’s divorce tracts (as well as his later poetry) actively reconsidered the 
significance of gender. Ann Hughes showed in an influential essay that the presentation of 
Leveller women in Leveller tracts served strategic purposes for the movement, and often 
centred on images of the household, rightly headed by a male husband and householder, 
though potentially horribly disrupted by the exigencies of 1640s politics and the persecution 
of the male Leveller leaders.73 I am not quite as convinced as Hughes that the male 
householder (rather than males lacking that status) was always the paradigmatic citizen for 
the Levellers, and we should certainly note the contexts in which Levellers did evoke female 
equality. Lilburne did so in looking back to Adam and Eve as the begetters of ‘all and every 
particular and individuall man and woman, that ever breathed in the world since, who are, 
and were by nature all equall and alike in power, dignity, authority, and majesty, none of 
them having (by nature) any authority dominion or majesteriall power, one over or above 
another’. The implication, never spelled out, is that for authority to be exercised by men over 
women, just as for men over other men, ‘mutuall consent and agreement, for the good benefit 
and comfort each of other’ must seal a transaction.74 The text, however, slides back into the 
male world of politics without considering whether this agreement would inevitably arise to 
establish a gendered order of domestic authority. The boldest of the Leveller women’s 
petitions claimed parity for women in spiritual matters (‘an interest in Christ, equal unto 
men’), but only a ‘proportionable’ (rather than equal) ‘share in the Freedoms of this 
Common-wealth’.75 However expansive their language might sometimes have been, the 
Levellers never sought political rights for ‘the poorest she’ to match those which Rainborowe 
demanded for ‘the poorest hee’ at Putney.76  
Milton’s more extensive negotiations with gender are far too complex to do justice to here, 
and, like those of the Levellers, are ambivalent enough to have given rise to competing 
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interpretations.77 But the importance of the household for Miltonic politics is far clearer than 
for the Levellers: in both his divorce tracts and his political works, Milton likened or linked 
the male householder’s autonomous exercise of authority over his wife and other 
subordinates in the household to his political freedom, and suggested that the political 
freedoms and duties of citizenship could not be meaningfully exercised by a man denied his 
authority at home.78 The authority of the male head of household should even extend, without 
the involvement of the state, to the ability to divorce an incompatible wife.79 While he 
conceded that, exceptionally, if a wife should ‘exceed her husband in prudence and dexterity, 
and he contentedly yeeld’ she should indeed have authority over him as ‘the wiser should 
govern the lesse wise’, he never stopped to consider whether such women might thus also be 
entitled to political citizenship.80  
Women, then, were assumed to be excluded from citizenship. In addition, both the 
Levellers and Milton saw masculinity as a characteristic feature of good citizenship. Lilburne 
repeatedly praised the publications of Levellers or sympathisers, including the petition of 11 
September 1648, as ‘masculine’.81 Milton’s ideal citizen was depicted as manly and 
masculine in strongly gendered terms, although Milton also sought to redefine that 
masculinity away from merely physical courage and did not see all males as necessarily 
endowed with it.82 But more subtle differences open up in the use of this evaluative language. 
The Levellers hardly ever accused anyone of effeminacy (although Walwyn did throw the 
accusation back at Thomas Edwards), and although they sometime referred to ‘weak’ or 
‘silly’ women they did so in ironic tribute to the ordeals these women had faced or the wit 
and strength they had mustered, leaving an impression of women transcending the assumed 
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limitations of their sex.83 Indeed, a Leveller woman might even act ‘like a true bred 
Englishwoman’, a phrase which comes close to creating a solid national body of women 
which compares with Lilburne’s ‘free-born Englishmen’.84 This was where Milton’s use of 
language diverged from the Levellers’: not only did he explicitly assert that women were ‘an 
inferiour sexe’,85 but he also far more actively mobilised the value-system of gender not just 
to praise good citizens but also to denigrate those men who fell short of this, whether an 
individual opponent like Salmasius, ‘effeminate and Uxorious Magistrates’ such as Charles I, 
or simply ‘unmanly’ citizens who could not be relied upon to uphold the cause of liberty.86 
By using gender not just to assert the positive values of citizenship, but to cast doubt on the 
fitness of all men to live up to those values, Milton’s rhetoric was in danger of fracturing 
rather than building up the citizen body. 
 
CONCLUSION  
The Levellers and Milton used shared arguments to make the case for an England not 
dependent on the will of a king, or of any arbitrary ruler. In discussing original freedom, 
consent, and political enslavement they used the same essential building-blocks to construct 
their arguments, building-blocks drawn from both ‘liberal’ and ‘republican’ traditions. Much 
of their positive evaluative vocabulary was the same: they valued vigorous, manly action in 
defence of liberty, based on reason and understanding. However, both theories and 
vocabulary could be differently deployed, and the resulting depictions of citizenship are 
strikingly different - challenging the claims of scholars who wish to assimilate Milton’s 
politics to Leveller thought. Milton’s vision of citizenship was more unsettled and 
ambivalent, oscillating between hope and doubt about the capacity of the people to rule 
themselves. When he invoked the authority of the ‘people’, it was a rather undefined or 
positively fictive body, which could be spoken or acted for by virtuous minorities. When he 
linked irrationality, immorality and servility with the ‘vulgar’ or ‘base’, he cast doubt on the 
capacity of the mass of the people ever to achieve the virtue necessary to speak for the 
people. When he likened men to women, children, or slaves – those whose status or 
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capacities put them outside the bounds of citizenship – he cast doubt on whether the status of 
a man, or even a male householder, was enough to secure the status of citizen, or at least 
raised the possibility of gradations within citizenship. By contrast, the Levellers’ mantra of 
the ‘free-born Englishman’ was designed to affirm that all men born in England qualified and 
their focus on ensuring political equality between citizens was central to their agenda. In 
practice they envisaged some exclusions from electoral citizenship based on dependence, but 
the rhetoric of their writings functioned to build up the solidity and uniformity of the citizen-
body of free-born Englishmen, even while urging readers to live up to that perhaps 
demanding status. 
What role were these citizens, as imagined by Milton and by the Levellers, to play? Both 
Milton and the Levellers were writing to address moments of political crisis and political 
possibility: not politics as usual within a constitutional framework, but moments when the 
framework itself was under threat or was being remade. For both Milton and the Levellers the 
people had a crucial role in achieving and authorising such constitutive actions. In their right 
‘of choosing, yea of changing their own Goverment’, in Milton’s terms, or in subscribing the 
third Agreement of the People, the final constitutional outline promoted by the Levellers, the 
people were exercising their ultimate sovereignty.87 But such constitutive acts of sovereignty 
stand at a distance from day-to-day governance. How regularly, and in what form, was 
popular power supposed to flow through the acts of everyday government? 
Michael Zuckert suggests that Milton’s framing of the right of the people to change their 
government in the Tenure ‘collapses the people’s constitutive power and their governing 
power’: there is no space for constitutionalism to stand in the way of the people’s will.88 Yet 
we have very little sense from Milton of what role the people should play outside times of 
crisis; and in times of crisis, it seems that the multitude will contribute to the momentum but 
may well defect from the cause, leaving a wiser minority to cope with the aftermath. Richard 
Tuck has suggested a new genealogy for modern democracy, running via Bodin, Hobbes, and 
Rousseau, and resting on the distinction between sovereignty and government, which enabled 
a ‘sleeping’ democratic sovereign to perform only occasional acts of sovereignty, while 
government was carried out without the direct involvement of the people.89 Although Milton 
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did not separate sovereignty and government in this way, in practice he seemed happy for 
popular authorisation of a government to become detached from the exercise of power, which 
in 1659-60 he envisaged being done through a perpetual senate. Thus his high aspirations for 
citizen virtue might come to be expressed through a tiny group of active governors who did 
not even fulfil the Aristotelian requirement of ruling and being ruled in turn.  
The Levellers’ vision involved precisely the kind of fluid continuing relationship between 
popular and institutional sovereignty which Zuckert suggests for Milton.90  Since the electoral 
role of the whole population of independent free-born Englishmen was central, we might 
assume that this represented a step away from the virtue-led ideals of classical republicanism, 
towards a wide but shallow kind of electoral citizenship. The Levellers gave the people the 
defensive role of curbing power and enforcing accountability91 – through annual elections, 
the right of petitioning, a recall mechanism for errant MPs (in one 1647 document),92 and – in 
extremis if not in everyday politics under a new constitution - direct action of unspecified but 
potentially violent kinds. This might seem to reduce the people’s role to a kind of self-
defence rather than a positive political wisdom. But this view underestimates the Levellers’ 
generous assessment of the people’s potential, which partook of many of the moral and 
intellectual ideals which republicans might have thought suitable only for the members of a 
more narrowly-defined citizen body, or only for people participating in the higher layers of 
that citizen activity. Voting itself could constitute a form of active citizenship;93 in the 
context of the increasingly politically-charged electoral activity which voters had experienced 
in the late 1620s and in 1640, the Levellers may well have imagined their broader electorate 
of well-informed and rational free-born Englishmen voting on the basis of candidates’ 
proposed priorities and allegiances, and not just voting to throw out corrupt sitting 
representatives. One transitory proposal made by Lilburne or a supporter in 1645 suggested 
an even more meaningful form of citizen participation, proposing that ‘every free-man 
of England, who is able, would bestow his servic[e] one yeere at least, freely for the good of 
the Civill State, in any Place or Office of Trust, whereof his skill and breeding doe fit him, to 
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be most capable.’ This ‘skill and breeding’ would not necessarily be associated with high 
birth: suitable men in financial need would be paid to enable them to undertake it.94  
Harrington’s ‘modern’ republicanism was a ‘democracy’ where the people were distanced 
from power by tiers of election and the popular assembly protected the people’s interests 
purely by the exercise of a non-deliberative veto. The classical republican reliance on the 
wisdom and virtue of a few still pervaded Oceana’s hierarchical constitution, but this 
‘democracy’ included a role for those who lacked that virtue. Milton maintained a classical 
republican commitment to a citizenship which might be deeply demanding – but was also 
apparently increasingly restricted, and might at most have the ‘the resemblance & effects of a 
perfect democracie’.95 The Levellers’ model of both wide and meaningful participation was 
in dramatic contrast to both. Nedham was only slightly exaggerating when he said that the 
Levellers’ proposals put ‘the whole multitude of the people into the equall exercise of the 
Supreme Authority’ – his definition of democracy.  
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